Dans le cadre des ateliers du GRIN, discussion autour du manuscrit de Miriam McCormick (University of Richmond) Beliefs as Emotions. Des chercheur.ses commenteront chacun des chapitres du manuscrit.

Abstract/Résumé:

In this work, I argue that beliefs are emotions. As such they contain both cognitive and non-cognitive elements. This view helps to solve puzzles in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and philosophy of religion. Further, there are clearly ethical components to how we conduct our doxastic lives, and thinking of beliefs as emotions helps us to understand the ethics of belief. Indeed, in Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief (Routledge2015), I suggest that we should think of beliefs as much more like emotions than philosophers tend to.  In my new book, I will more fully develop this idea and its implications.

(More details here.)