On Friday, November 8, 2024, from 10:00AM to 12:00PM, Robin McKenna (University of Liverpool) will offer a lecture entitled “Doing Your Own (Patient Activist) Research”, organized by the Groupe de recherche interuniversitaire sur la normativité (GRIN).

The event will take place in room DS-1950 of Pavilion J.-A. De Sève, at the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM), 320 Sainte-Catherine Street East. The conference will also be presented on Zoom.

This talk is about the author’s work in progress. If you wish to access the article in question, please contact us at grin.normativity@gmail.com.

Abstract

The slogan “Do Your Own Research” (DYOR) is often invoked by people who are distrustful, even downright sceptical, of recognized expert authorities. While this slogan may serve various rhetorical purposes, it also expresses an ethic of inquiry that valorises independent thinking and rejects uncritical deference to recognized experts. This paper is a qualified defence of this ethic of inquiry in one of the central contexts in which it might seem attractive. I use several case studies of patient activist groups to argue that these groups often engage in valuable independent research that advances biomedical knowledge. In doing so they demonstrate the value of “lay expertise” and the epistemic as well as political necessity of not simply deferring to recognized experts. I also give some reasons why patient activist groups often produce valuable biomedical knowledge: they are examples of what I call “research collectives”. Research collectives are research communities that differ from the traditional research communities we find in universities and research institutes in that their members typically lack formal relevant scientific credentials and training. But they are similar in that they have internal structures—training procedures, norms of discussion, venues for holding discussions—that facilitate the production of knowledge. I finish by suggesting that future research into the differences and similarities between research collectives and traditional research communities is required.

The CRÉ is pleased to invite you to a book roundtable on Jonathan Birch’s The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI (Oxford University Press, 2024).

Speakers:

Jonathan Birch (London School of Economics)

Stevan Harnard (Université du Québec à Montréal)

Jonathan Kimmelman (McGill)

Martin Gibert (Université de Montréal/CRÉ)

Chair: Virginie Simoneau-Gilbert (University of Oxford)

Book summary:

Can octopuses feel pain and pleasure? What about crabs, shrimps, insects or spiders? How do we tell whether a person unresponsive after severe brain injury might be suffering? When does a fetus in the womb start to have conscious experiences? Could there even be rudimentary feelings in miniature models of the human brain, grown from human stem cells? What about AI?

These are questions about the edge of sentience, and they are subject to enormous, disorienting uncertainty. The stakes are immense, and neglecting the risks can have terrible costs. We need to err on the side of caution, yet it’s often far from clear what ‘erring on the side of caution’ should mean in practice. When are we going too far? When are we not doing enough?

The Edge of Sentience presents a precautionary framework designed to help us reach ethically sound, evidence-based decisions despite our uncertainty.

Brice Arsène Mankou sits down with Alain Mabanckou, author of Cette femme qui nous regarde. Angela Davis, l’Amérique et moi (Robert Laffont, 2024).

To join via Zoom, click here.

As part of the activities of the Philosophy of Work Network, Jan Kandiyali (Durham University) and Barry Maguire (University of Edinburgh) will offer a presentation entitled: “Socialism and Collective Ownership of the Means of Production”.

The activities of the Philosophy of Work Network are open to researchers and graduate students with research interests in this area. Please write to the organizers, Denise Celentano (denise.celentano@umontreal.ca) and Pablo Gilabert (pablo.gilabert@concordia.ca), to receive the zoom link.

Abstract

Historically, socialism has been identified with collective ownership of the means of production. However, in the face of the failure of central planning, and influential arguments about the necessity of markets and private ownership, many contemporary socialists have sought to sever the link between socialism and collective ownership. The socialists we have in mind define socialism exclusively in terms of a set of values, usually some form of robust equality of opportunity, and then see the question of what form of economic organisation realises those values as entirely separate. In this paper, we reject this decoupling of socialism from collective ownership. Our argument has two steps. In the first, we outline an important but nowadays underappreciated value, namely that of solidarity or mutual care, understood as the positive counterpart to productive alienation, and argue that this, rather than robust equality of opportunity, is the heart of the socialist ideal. The ideal of solidarity is one in which we all care about one another, and care that we care about one another. In the second, we show that solidarity is partly constituted by collective ownership of the means of production.

As part of the Ethics Lunchtime series, Nick Clanchy will give a presentation titled “Roland Barthes on the Epistemic Demands of Love.”

To join via Zoom, click here.

Photo by Ulf Andersen/Getty Images.

As part of the Ethics Lunchtime Series, Thomas Emmaüs Adetou will present his work on the responsibility gap in the context of artificial systems.

To join via Zoom, click here.

As part of the CRÉ Midis de l’éthique Series, Anna Milioni will present a talk entitled ‘Citizenship beyond Sedentariness.’

To join via Zoom, click here.

Abstract

A powerful argument against the exclusion of migrants from citizenship rights suggests that this exclusion leads to the formation of a political underclass that undermines equality within the state. In response to this critique, it is often argued that citizenship is permissibly exclusionary. Political communities, the argument goes, have a right to determine who gets access to citizenship, at least within certain limits: while it is generally considered impermissible to exclude people on the basis of their racial identity, ethnic origin, or social class, access to citizenship can permissibly be conditional upon the fulfillment of other requirements, such as a minimum period of residence or a citizenship test. This paper scrutinizes three supposedly innocuous requirements for naturalisation: minimum residence requirements, citizenship tests set at a modest level of difficulty, and loyalty oaths. I hold that these conditions only seem innocuous insofar as we assume that people are predominantly sedentary, and that even people who migrate ultimately settle in their new state of residence. Yet, these assumptions have been criticised as being both empirically mistaken and potentially exclusionary toward those who do not fall within the sedentary paradigm. Taking this critique seriously, I show that minimum residence requirements (section 1), citizenship tests (section 2), and loyalty oaths (section 3) only seem
to be innocuous because of these background assumptions of sedentariness. Once we drop the assumption that people who migrate settle permanently in their new state of residence, and we switch our focus to the many ways in which people can be mobile, these conditions cease to appear permissible. I begin by bringing to the fore various types of mobile migrants, i.e., migrants who do not have the intention and/or the legal right to settle permanently in their current state of residence. This focus on mobility allows me to show how each of these conditions rely on assumptions of sedentariness that prevent various types of mobile migrants from accessing citizenship (sections 1-3). I then argue that residence requirements, citizenship tests, and loyalty oaths violate are impermissible, as they violate two standardly accepted conditions for exclusionary migration policies: that they are publicly justifiable to migrants and that they are not discriminatory (section 4). In the final section, I explore the implications of my argument for citizenship (section 5).

As part of the CRÉ Midis de l’éthique Series, Abraham Tejiri Tobi will present a talk entitled ‘How Beliefs Harm.’

To join via Zoom, click here.

Midis de l’éthique series: Olusegun Samuel will present his work in progress.

To participate via Zoom, clic here.