Sarah Stroud joined the department of philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2018. She was previously Professor of Philosophy at McGill University, where she taught from 1993 to 2018. She holds degrees from Harvard (A.B.) and Princeton (Ph.D.). She works across central areas of moral philosophy, with a particular focus on foundational issues in moral psychology and moral theory and on the intersection of such issues with metaethics and the philosophy of action. She has published papers on such topics as partiality, moral demandingness and overridingness, lying and testimony, practical irrationality, and the moral implications and significance of personal relationships. She co-edited Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (OUP, 2003) and the International Encyclopedia of Ethics (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).

Selected publications

• “Unsettling Subjectivism About Value,” in Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny, and Wai-hung Wong,eds., The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 249-270
• “Acts of Will,” critical study of Richard Holton, Willing, Wanting, Waiting, The Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2011), pp. 851-855
• “Permissible Partiality, Projects, and Plural Agency,” in Brian Feltham and John Cottingham, eds., Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships and the Wider World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 131-149
• “Is Procrastination Weakness of Will?”, in Chrisoula Andreou and Mark D. White, eds., The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 51-67
• “Weakness of Will,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, plato.stanford.edu/entries/weaknesswill, published May 2008 (c. 10,000 words)
• « La partialité par les projets », Les ateliers de l’éthique 3 (2008), pp. 41-51 (special issue guest edited by Christine Tappolet, Amitiés et partialité en éthique/Friendships and partiality in ethics)
• “Moral Worth and Rationality as Acting on Good Reasons,” Philosophical Studies 134 (2007), pp. 449-456
• “Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,” Ethics 116 (2006), pp. 498-524
• Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet, eds., Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003 (paperback edition 2007). x, 317 pp. [a collection of eleven new essays plus introduction] www.oup.co.uk/isbn/0-19-925736-1
• Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet, “Introduction,” in Stroud and Tappolet 2003, pp. 1-16
• “Weakness of Will and Practical Judgement,” in Stroud and Tappolet 2003, pp. 121-146

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