As part of the CRÉ Midis de l’éthique Series, Anna Milioni will present a talk entitled ‘Citizenship beyond Sedentariness.’

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Abstract

A powerful argument against the exclusion of migrants from citizenship rights suggests that this exclusion leads to the formation of a political underclass that undermines equality within the state. In response to this critique, it is often argued that citizenship is permissibly exclusionary. Political communities, the argument goes, have a right to determine who gets access to citizenship, at least within certain limits: while it is generally considered impermissible to exclude people on the basis of their racial identity, ethnic origin, or social class, access to citizenship can permissibly be conditional upon the fulfillment of other requirements, such as a minimum period of residence or a citizenship test. This paper scrutinizes three supposedly innocuous requirements for naturalisation: minimum residence requirements, citizenship tests set at a modest level of difficulty, and loyalty oaths. I hold that these conditions only seem innocuous insofar as we assume that people are predominantly sedentary, and that even people who migrate ultimately settle in their new state of residence. Yet, these assumptions have been criticised as being both empirically mistaken and potentially exclusionary toward those who do not fall within the sedentary paradigm. Taking this critique seriously, I show that minimum residence requirements (section 1), citizenship tests (section 2), and loyalty oaths (section 3) only seem
to be innocuous because of these background assumptions of sedentariness. Once we drop the assumption that people who migrate settle permanently in their new state of residence, and we switch our focus to the many ways in which people can be mobile, these conditions cease to appear permissible. I begin by bringing to the fore various types of mobile migrants, i.e., migrants who do not have the intention and/or the legal right to settle permanently in their current state of residence. This focus on mobility allows me to show how each of these conditions rely on assumptions of sedentariness that prevent various types of mobile migrants from accessing citizenship (sections 1-3). I then argue that residence requirements, citizenship tests, and loyalty oaths violate are impermissible, as they violate two standardly accepted conditions for exclusionary migration policies: that they are publicly justifiable to migrants and that they are not discriminatory (section 4). In the final section, I explore the implications of my argument for citizenship (section 5).