New article by Alexis Morin-Martel (McGill), recipient of the 2023-2024 CRÉ graduate student scholarship, entitled “Dreier Is a Great Dad in All Possible Worlds: A Challenge to Moral Contingentism”, published in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

Summary

In this paper, I raise a challenge to Gideon Rosen’s defence of moral contingentism against Jamie Dreier’s moral luck argument. Dreier argues that if moral contingentism is true, acting in a morally permissible way always depends on a form of moral luck, because we could be in a descriptively identical possible world where the moral laws are different. Rosen’s response is that such a world is too remote from ours for us to count it as lucky that we are not in it. I argue that, given Rosen’s method of assessing the remoteness of possible worlds, worlds like the one Dreier describes are close enough to ours to justify his worry, and consequently that Rosen’s counterargument fails. I take this strongly counterintuitive conclusion as a reason to be optimistic that Rosen’s argument for moral contingentism can be resisted.