Pour sa 43e conférence, Fillosophie a la plaisir d’acceuillir Natalie Stoljar (McGill University), qui présentera une conférence intitulée “Effective Intentions and Autonomy : A Social-Relational Analysis” le vendredi 18 octobre, de 13h à 15h, au département de philosophie de l’UQAM (455 boulevard René-Levesque Est), local W-5215.

Cet événement est gratuit et ouvert à tout le monde. Du café et des collations seront servis.

Voici un résumé de la conférence, suivi d’une courte biographie de la conférencière. La conférence se tiendra en anglais.

Résumé de la conférence :

“Despite controversy over how to conceptualize the notion of autonomy, nearly all theories of autonomy contain a ‘competency’ dimension. The competency dimension includes not only a requirement of well-functioning rationality. It also includes the ability to have what autonomy theorists call ‘effective intentions.’ As Gerald Dworkin puts it, “the idea of autonomy is not merely an evaluative or reflective notion, but includes as well some ability both to alter one’s preferences and to make them effective in one’s actions and, indeed, to make them effective because one has reflected upon them and adopted them as one’s own” (Dworkin 1988).  It is often assumed that only psychological impairments – e.g. brainwashing, addiction, compulsion, hypnosis, being under the influence of drugs or alcohol – block the effectiveness of intentions. This assumption supports ‘internalist’ conceptions of autonomy. I draw on literature from feminist philosophy, particularly literature on the phenomenon of ‘silencing,’ to argue that the effectiveness of intentions can be blocked by social and interpersonal conditions as well as by psychological ones. This argument suggests that purely internalist notions of autonomy can’t be sustained.”

Biographie :

Natalie Stoljar is a professor of philosophy at McGill University. Her research is in feminist philosophy, social and political philosophy, and the philosophy of law. In social and political philosophy, her work focuses on relational conceptions of autonomy. She is co-editor (with Catriona Mackenzie) of the 2000 collection Relational Autonomy. Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self (OUP). In feminist philosophy, she has written on feminist metaphysics, especially gender essentialism, realism and nominalism. In the philosophy of law, she has published on legal interpretation, constitutional interpretation and judicial review, and the methodology of law. She is currently working on procedural justice and the ethics of policy and legal processes.

Prof. Stoljar is the Subject Editor for Gender and Feminism for The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (General Editor, Tim Crane, University of Cambridge). Her research is funded by a SSHRC Insight Grant, ‘Silencing, Objectification and Negative Social Scripts. Do They Undermine Autonomy?’ (2016-2020), and a SSHRC Insight Development Grant (with Kristin Voigt), ‘Relational Equality and Relational Autonomy’ (2016-2019).

She is the author of numerous papers, and among them: ‘Gender and the Unthinkable.’ In P. Garavaso (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Feminism in 2018, and ‘Answerability: A Condition of Autonomy or Moral Responsibility or Both?’ In K. Hutchinson, M. Oshana and C. Mackenzie (eds) The Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility (Oxford University Press).

Vous pouvez retrouver l’évènement sur Facebook, avec le lien ci-après, https://www.facebook.com/events/2462843480627274/, et sur le site web, ici https://fillosophie.com/programmation/.