Kristin Andrews (York University)
Kristin Andrews – Animal Rights and the Cluster Concept of PersonPour sa 35e conférence, Fillosophie a le plaisir d’accueillir Kristin Andrews (York University), le vendredi 28 septembre, 13h, au département de philosophie de l’UQÀM(W-5215). Titre : « Animal Rights and the Cluster Concept of Person » Résumé : Other animals do not need to be dehumanized, because nonhuman animals are not human. The use of “animal” as a derogatory term reflects the special status given to humans. However, that value of humans isn’t due to mere biological status, but is associated instead with the moral status of personhood. Recent court cases in the US and Argentina, and new laws in Canada, France and India are promoting the idea that other animals should also be considered persons, thereby gaining the moral status and some legal rights granted to humans. The legal cases in the US, which focus on chimpanzees and elephants, have as their goal the transformation of animals from property to persons. As with human persons who are unable to care for themselves, nonhuman animals would have human caregivers with the duty of looking after their best interests. I will present and respond to objections raised by the US courts which are also addressed in our new book Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers’ Brief (Routledge 2018). I will then develop a cluster concept version of the capacities account of personhood. This view assures that all existing persons remain persons, and it also includes many nonhuman animals as persons. I will conclude by briefly describing how some species fulfill the cluster concept of person in such as way as to warrant the ascription of the term, and the corresponding moral considerability, and will consider some practical consequences about the moral acceptability of zoos, circuses, cetacean shows, swimming with dolphin projects, and the use of animal actors in entertainment and advertising. Bio : Kristin Andrews est à la tête de la York Research Chair in Animal Minds. Elle est professeure associée au département de philosophie de York University, et a été élue au College of the Royal Society of Canada en 2015. Sa recherche s’inscrit dans les enjeux liés à la psychologie du sens commun et de la compréhension sociale, l’évolution de la moralité, la méthodologie en recherche sur la cognition animale, et les droits des animaux. Ses publications incluent les livres Do Apes Read Minds? Toward a New Folk Psychology (MIT 2012) – The Animal Mind (Routledge 2015) – et, co-écrit avec une équipe de 15 philosophes, Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers Brief (Routledge 2018).
La conférence est gratuite et ouverte à tout le monde. |
