Dans le cadre de ses ateliers, le GRIN accueille Matthew Chrisman.

Making up Our Minds and What We Ought to Believe

Abstract:

Two perennial views about doxastic agency and normativity come from the Cartesian (rationalist) picture, according to which forming beliefs is like other things we actively and, in the good case, rationally do, and the Humean (reliabilist) picture, according to which the mental is just part of the physiological, and belief states are very much like other physiological states in being indirectly and possibly rationally controllable but not actively acquired. In this paper, I explore some options towards a middle ground between: the Bifurcated, Aristotlean, Kantian, and Hegelian pictures. My ultimate goal is to defend a roughly Hegelian conception of doxastic agency that coheres with my antecedent views about epistemic normativity.